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Philosophy and Theology

In November 2007, the Committee on Ethics of the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) issued committee opinion 385, titled
“The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine.” 1The committee
enumerated a series of recommendations that “maximize accommodation of an
individual’s religious or moral beliefs while avoiding imposition of these beliefs on
others or interfering with the safe, timely, and financially feasible access to repro
ductive health care that all women deserve.”12 These recommendations include the
following seven provisions:
1. In the provision of reproductive services, the patient’s well-being must be
paramount. Any conscientious refusal that conflicts with a patient’s well
being should be accommodated only if the primary duty to the patient can
be fulfilled.
2. Health care providers must impart accurate and unbiased information so that
patients can make informed decisions about their health care. They must
disclose scientifically accurate and professionally accepted characterizations
of reproductive health services.

1American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Committee on Ethics,
“The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine,” opinion no. 385, Novem
ber 2007, http://www.acog.org/from_home/publications/ethics/co385.pdf. This opinion has
generated several critiques. See, for example, American Association of Pro Life Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, “Response to the ACOG Ethics Committee Opinion #385,” February
6, 2008, http://www.aaplog.org/responsetoacogethicscommittee385_2-6-08.pdf; and Dr.
Bob Orr of the Christian Medical and Dental Association, “Critique of ACOG Committee
Opinion # 385,” http://www.cmda.org/AM/Template.cfm?Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.
cfm&ContentID=10375.
2ACOG, “Limits of Conscientious Refusal,” 2.
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3. Where conscience implores physicians to deviate from standard practices,
including abortion, sterilization, and provision of contraceptives, they must
provide potential patients with accurate and prior notice oftheir personal moral
commitments. In the process of providing prior notice, physicians should not
use their professional authority to argue or advocate these positions.
4. Physicians and other health care professionals have the duty to refer patients
in a timely manner to other providers if they do not feel that they can in
conscience provide the standard reproductive services that their patients
request.
5. In an emergency in which referral is not possible or might negatively affect
a patient’s physical or mental health, providers have an obligation to provide
medically indicated and requested care regardless of the provider’s personal
moral objections.
6. In resource-poor areas, access to safe and legal reproductive services should
be maintained. Conscientious refusals that undermine access should raise
significant caution. Providers with moral or religious objections should either
practice in proximity to individuals who do not share their views or ensure
that referral processes are in place so that patients have access to the service
that the physician does not wish to provide. Rights to withdraw from caring
for an individual should not be a pretext for interfering with patients’ rights
to health care services.
7. Lawmakers should advance policies that balance protection of providers’
consciences with the critical goal of ensuring timely, effective, evidencebased, and safe access to all women seeking reproductive services.3
In order to justify these recommendations, the opinion of the committee appeals
to a definition of conscience as “the private, constant, ethically attuned part of the
human character. . . . An appeal to conscience would express a sentiment such as,
“If I were to do ‘x,’ I could not live with myself/ I would hate myself/ I wouldn’t be
able to sleep at night.”4
Certain elements of the definition of conscience proposed by the ACOG
committee are unobjectionable, such as the desire to avoid inner discord and the
“ethically attuned” aspect of conscience which hints at a response to something
objective. A concern for patient well-being is certainly laudable. However, on the
whole, the foundation of the seven ACOG recommendations as well as many of the
recommendations themselves are at odds with a sound understanding of ethics and
conscience and furthermore fail to appreciate, or respect, the genuine pluralism that
exists about the nature and claims of conscience.
The committee’s understanding of conscience reflects a particular philosophical
view, one that can hardly be taken as self-evident. It is not made clear in the document

3Ibid., 5.
4Ibid., 2.
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why this peculiar account of conscience (perhaps originating with Thomas Hobbes)
was adopted, nor why this one philosophical view of ethics and conscience should be
imposed on the entire membership of the ACOG. With Hobbes, the ACOG guidelines
presuppose that ethics is ultimately a matter of the private emotions and sentiments
rather than a matter of common rationality and practical wisdom, as Plato, Aristotle,
Cicero, Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, John Henry Newman, and Simon Soloveychik held. The difference between a properly formed conscience and a malformed
conscience consists in part in that a properly formed conscience reflects an ethical
soundness which is not an idiosyncratic private taste, but rather may be a communally,
publicly shared judgment precisely because it is based on shared rationality.
In the ACOG opinion, conscience reflects not one’s best judgment at the con
clusion of a process of moral deliberation from fundamental moral principles about
what is right and wrong all things considered (ultima facie), but a feeling that is
merely a matter of a provider’s personal experience of loss of self-respect. “Although
respect for conscience is a value, it is only a prima facie value, which means it can
and should be overridden in the interest of other moral obligations that outweigh
it in a given circumstance.”5 The committee opinion thus construes claims of con
science as prima facie values that can and should be “overridden” by the agent in
light of other moral considerations. When this idiosyncratic desire not to feel shame
is set against the well-being of a patient, naturally the patient’s well-being trumps
the private, sentimental desire to keep one’s hands clean. The ACOG conception of
conscience as a prima facie guide contradicts, for example, the proximate supremacy
of conscience as an unconditional command (Kant), a magisterial dictate (Newman),
and the famous dictum of conscience, “were its might equal to its right, it would rule
the world” (Butler). Sophocles in Antigone, Socrates in the Crito, and Aquinas in the
Summa theologiae (I-II, Q 19.5) all testify that an agent’s best ethical judgment—the
judgment of conscience— simply cannot be overridden.
Not only is the ACOG’s definition of conscience only one among many under
standings of conscience and hardly representative, but also its peculiar definition is
problematic in two additional respects. First, there is no reason why conscience must
be constant, for people can and should change their consciences to accord with the
truth as best as they can determine it. Second, the violation of conscience does not
necessarily lead to emotional turmoil or subjective feelings of guilt (“If I were to
do ‘x,’ I could not live with myself/ I would hate myself/ I wouldn’t be able to sleep
at night”). A violation of conscience makes the agent objectively guilty for having
knowingly and willingly done something against the agent’s best ethical judgment.
Being guilty in this sense is fully compatible with a wide range of emotional reac
tions. The wicked sometimes sleep soundly.
The idiosyncratic foundation of the ACOG document’s recommendations is
not only philosophically (and theologically) problematic from a diverse variety of
perspectives (such as those represented by Sophocles, Socrates, Aquinas, Kant,
Butler, Newman, and Soloveychik), but the recommendations themselves are also

5Ibid., 3.
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highly objectionable. “Physicians and other health care professionals have the duty
to refer patients in a timely manner to other providers if they do not feel that they
can in conscience provide the standard reproductive services that patients request.”6
A pro-life physician could follow the letter of this recommendation and refer a pa
tient to another pro-life doctor. However, if construed (as seemingly intended by
the committee) as a duty to refer to a doctor who has no conscientious objection
to abortion, this recommendation proposes a duty to cooperate in the wrongdoing
of another by not merely providing what is needed to commit wrongdoing, but by
helping patients precisely in their wrongdoing. It would indeed be absurd to say, “I
would have a guilty conscience if she did ‘x.’”7 However, it is not at all absurd to
say, “I would have a guilty conscience if I helped her to do ‘x.’” Conscience may or
may not demand that one rebuke or obstruct other providers, but it surely demands
that one not formally assist in the wrongdoing. This becomes intuitively clear when
we substitute for “x” something uncontroversially evil. Would it really “absolve” a
physician from guilt if he did not personally prescribe a drug in order for a patient
to commit date rapes, but rather helped the rapist achieve his goal by referring him
to another doctor to fill the prescription? It is true that some patients would still do
“x” even without a referral. However, formal cooperation in the wrongdoing of others
is not eliminated simply because the wrongdoer is intent on doing wrong regardless
of the cooperation given.
One would have strong reason to suspect that the ACOG has chosen its definition
of conscience precisely to yield the specific recommendations that it wanted, given
that the ACOG’s previous policy positions would imply a very different understanding
ofthe nature, scope, and claims of conscience. Previously, the ACOG has championed
the individual judgment of the physician about what counts as medically indicated
for a patient in particular circumstances as a buttress against laws criminalizing
abortion procedures. On this view, if a particular physician believes it is in the best
interest of the health of the woman to have an abortion, then this judgment qualifies
the procedure as legal under the guidelines set by Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton.
In the words of the ACOG statement of policy on abortion (reaffirmed in 2004), a
partial-birth abortion “may be the best or most appropriate procedure in a particular
circumstance to save the life or preserve the health of the woman, and only the doctor,
in consultation with the patient, based on the woman’s particular circumstances can
make that decision. . . . The intervention of legislative bodies into medical decision
making is inappropriate, ill advised, and dangerous.”8 It would seem then that the
judgment of the individual physician about what is medically indicated trumps any
sort of universalized ruling that abstracts for the particularities of the situation as
understood by the physician chosen by the patient. However, some physicians in
conscience refuse to provide contraceptives or perform abortions because, having

6Ibid., 5.
7Ibid., 2.
8ACOG Statement of Policy, “Abortion Policy,” January 1993 (reaffirmed July 1994),
3; available at http://www.sdhealthyfamilies.org/media/pdf/ACOGAbortionPolicy.pdf.
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examined the empirical evidence,9 in their judgment these practices are contrary to
the well-being of their patients. In these cases, when an affirmation of the autonomy
of a physician in determining medically indicated care might result in an abortion
not being performed, opinion 385 overrides the judgment ofthe treating physician in
favor of “standard care” as determined by the ACOG, a kind of legislative body.
The ACOG opinion not only unfairly limits a doctor’s liberty in action but
also infringes on a physician’s freedom of speech. In other contexts, the ACOG has
argued against “gag rules” that inhibit a physician from communicating to the pa
tient about what is, in the physician’s judgment, relevant for making sure the patient
can give informed consent and proper treatment. “Serious ethical problems arise if
organizational rules (so-called “gag rules”) preclude such disclosures.” 10However,
in opinion 385, physicians may not even communicate their own views about treat
ment unless they parrot “professionally accepted characterizations of reproductive
health services.” Freedom of speech is therefore sharply curtailed, since doctors are
expressly forbidden “to argue or advocate” views that dissent from ACOG committee
policy. Such physicians are also forced, even in contexts where such matters may
not be at issue, to make their views known to patients, and yet at the same time the
new ACOG gag rule forbids them to indicate why they hold these views.
The flawed understanding of conscience accepted by opinion 385 actually
commits the ACOG, by extension and analogy, to positions that reasonable people
would in other circumstances find repugnant. This may be seen by substituting other
practices for abortion and contraception. The same rules, for example, adopted in a
different cultural and legal milieu, would only allow a conscientious objector not to
perform female genital mutilation (FGM) so long as the objector were forced to refer
patients to those who do perform female genital mutilation, and as long as someone
else were available. If the physician responds that female genital mutilation goes
against his conception of good medicine, not only must the physician act in certain
circumstances against what he believes is medically indicated, but the objector must
also mouth to the patient or guardian “professionally accepted characterizations” of
the practice, as understood in the predominant cultural and enforced legal milieu
without “use of their professional authority to argue or advocate” against FGM.

9See Royal College of Psychiatrists, “Position Statement on Women’s Mental Health
in Relation to Induced Abortion,” Times Online, March 14, 2008, http://extras.timesonline.
co.uk/abortion.pdf. See also Thomas W. Strahan, Detrimental Effects o f Abortion: An
Annotated Bibliography with Commentary, 3rd ed. (Springfield, IL: Acorn Books, 2001);
Elizabeth Ring-Cassidy and Ian Gentles, Women’s Health after Abortion: The Medical
and Psychological Evidence, 2nd ed. (Toronto: deVeber Institute for Bioethics and Social
Research, 2003); and C. Kahlenborn et. al., “Oral Contraceptive Use as a Risk Factor for
Premenopausal Breast Cancer: A Meta-analysis” Mayo Clinic Proceedings 81.10 (2006):
1290-1302.
10ACOG Committee on Ethics, “Ethical Decision Making in Obstetrics and Gynecol
ogy,” opinion no. 390, December 2007, 6, http://www.acog.org/from_home/publications/ethics/co390.pdf.
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Would such rules, for the physician practicing in places where FGM is legally and
culturally accepted, provide an adequate protection (let alone “maximize accom
modation”) for the doctor conscientiously objecting to FGM?
Consider examples closer to home. A physician working in a correctional fa
cility is asked to facilitate giving a lethal injection to a prisoner on death row. The
physician firmly believes that capital punishment is immoral and further, having
closely followed this prisoner’s case, is convinced the condemned is actually innocent.
However, let us suppose that state law allows only employees of the correctional
facility to be in the room during the execution, and since he is the only physician
employed in the prison, according to the principles for conscience set by the ACOG,
the physician has a duty to execute the prisoner. Likewise, in places where euthanasia
or physician-assisted suicide is legal, similar conscience guidelines would require
physicians opposed to these practices to kill or help kill their patients if no other
physician is available.
Part of the argument made by the ACOG is that the obligations undertaken by
the physician’s acceptance of his role as physician (and the privileges this entails)
bind the doctor more firmly than the judgment of conscience. However, it in no way
follows that undertaking certain obligations vacates the demands of conscience.
Ironically, the committee report would undermine the autonomy of physicians to
an even greater degree than a military oath to obey superior officers limits the au
tonomy of soldiers. A man volunteering for military service freely takes an oath to
obey his superior and receives all the privileges and responsibilities that come with
that oath. But let us suppose his lawful superior orders him to do something that the
soldier considers to be immoral. In the understanding of conscience imposed by the
ACOG committee, a soldier could disobey an order only if there were other soldiers
available to carry it out. If not, then the solider has a duty to carry out the order
that he considers immoral. Surely, however, the demands of conscience must not be
gerrymandered by the availability of less enlightened and conscientious people.
One of the concerns of the committee is that the exercise of conscientious
objection not create or reinforce racial discrimination or socioeconomic inequali
ties in society. However, the ACOG opinion itself encourages unfair discrimination
against anyone who refuses to take innocent human life, including many religious
believers, particularly Catholics. Any Catholic who accepts the teaching of the
Church will be unable to practice medicine in accordance with the recommendations
of the committee. Like any intentional killing of innocent human beings, perform
ing abortions violates Catholic teaching, and indeed when knowingly and willing
done, the agent who procures an abortion “incurs an automatic (latae sententiae)
excommunication” (can. 1398). Circumstances—such as practicing medicine in a
remote location—might lead to a situation in which a Catholic doctor is the only
physician available to perform an abortion, and under the rules of the committee
would therefore be required to do so. In a more typical case, the committee opinion
seems to require a conscientious objector to refer a woman for abortion to a provider
who will perform the abortion. In other words, it requires the conscientious objector
to cooperate in the abortion. As Bishop Rene H. Gracida notes, “Accomplices are
also subject to the penalty of excommunication if the abortion would not have been
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committed without their efforts (canon 1329.2).”11 Thus, if the referral were really
needed in order to perform the abortion, the one making the referral would seem
to share in the penalty of automatic excommunication. And if the referral were not
really needed in order to secure the abortion, it is difficult to see why the physician
should be required to perform a superfluous act, other than to mislead a patient about
the physician’s views on abortion.
Conscientious Catholic physicians cannot act in accordance with the commit
tee’s regulations. The committee view creates a professional environment discourag
ing if not prohibitive to Catholics and certain other faithful Christians who oppose
abortion. Thus, in effect, opinion 385 also reinforces prejudice and discrimination
against ethnic minority groups who are disproportionately Catholic and Evangelical,
such as Latinos and African-Americans.
The many difficulties occasioned by opinion 385 could be reasonably avoided,
and the legitimate autonomy of both patients and doctors secured, by recognizing
the proper scope of liberty on all sides. Physicians have the autonomy to determine
what is in their view medically indicated for the patients they serve, and to deter
mine whether they are willing to provide this service; patients have the autonomy
to reject or accept any options offered by their physicians as well as the freedom
to choose their physician. Either side may misuse their autonomy, but as a prima
facie starting point this seems much preferable to the one-sided emphasis on patient
autonomy found in the committee opinion. Physicians should not be cast into the
role of medical automatons forced to perform actions contrary to their best ethical
and medical judgments.
Ch r is t o p h e r K a c z o r , Ph .D.
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

11
Bishop Rene H. Gracida, D.D., “Choose Life, Not Death! A Pastoral Letter on
Abortion and Excommunication,” September 8, 1990, http://www.priestsforlife.org/magisterium/gracida.htm.
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